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ABSTRACT 
Higher world food prices have led many governments in developing countries to adopt policy 
measures to mitigate the adverse impact on low-income households. This paper sets out a partial 
equilibrium framework to evaluate the relative efficiency, distributional, and revenue implications of 
alternative policy responses. The model is applied to Madagascar data to evaluate the net welfare 
impact of reductions in rice tariffs and to compare this to the alternative policy of targeted transfers. 
Lowering tariffs is not a cost-effective approach to protecting low-income households due to 
substantial leakage of benefits to higher income households and an adverse impact on poor net rice 
producers even when the substantial efficiency gains from such tariff reductions are incorporated into 
the analysis. Developing a system of well-designed and -implemented targeted direct transfers to poor 
households is thus likely to be a substantially more cost-effective approach to poverty alleviation, 
especially if these can be linked to productivity-enhancing investments. Such an approach should be 
financed by switching revenue raising from rice tariffs to more efficient tax instruments. These policy 
conclusions are likely to be robust to the incorporation of general equilibrium considerations. 
Keywords:  Madagascar, rice, import tariffs, targeted transfers, welfare impacts 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent large increases in cereal and other food prices have led many governments to adopt policies 
intended to mitigate the adverse impact on households, especially low-income households that allocate 
a substantial proportion of their total budget to food. Since 2000, the nominal price of wheat has 
increased about threefold and the prices of corn and rice have doubled. Both exporting and importing 
countries have responded with policies aimed at reducing domestic food prices. Exporting countries 
have increased export taxes or imposed quotas on food exports. Importing countries have reduced 
import tariffs and other food taxes or introduced price controls. 
When evaluating the welfare impact of such policy responses, it is important to incorporate 
not only their distributional effectiveness but also their implications for efficiency and government 
revenues. In addition, this net welfare impact should be compared to alternative policy responses. In 
this paper we set out a simple partial equilibrium framework that facilitates such an evaluation. This 
model is then used to evaluate two policy options considered in Madagascar to mitigate the adverse 
impact of higher rice prices on low-income households, namely, lowering rice tariffs or introducing 
targeted transfers. 
In early 2004, the Malagasy economy suffered a series of shocks resulting in pressure on the 
government to introduce measures to counteract the negative effects on the real incomes of poor 
households. Madagascar’s rice harvest typically occurs from March through June, and in February and 
March 2004, there was severe cyclone damage to the rice harvest and also to crucial market 
infrastructure. In addition, the world price of rice increased substantially with a 43 percent increase in 
the Bangkok dollar price of rice. During the same period, the Malagasy franc (FMG) also experienced 
rapid depreciation of 58 percent relative to the dollar. The import parity price of rice thus increased by 
113 percent between January and August 2004 (Minten and Dorosh, 2006). Such price increases can 
be expected to have a substantial welfare impact on households, as rice is a staple in Madagascar. 
These events led to an active policy debate regarding the appropriate policy instrument to use 
to mitigate their poverty impact, in particular whether the government should decrease the import tax 
on rice to bring about a decrease in the domestic price of rice or instead rely on direct transfers to poor 
households. At the time, rice imports were subject both to an import tax of 20 percent and a value-
added tax (VAT) of 21 percent (levied on the import tax-inclusive price), which together yield a net 
tax rate of 45 percent. Those in favor of reducing the rice tariff argued that this would lower the 
domestic price and quickly benefit the poor. Those against argued that lower tariffs would have 
adverse effects on tax revenues and the balance of payments and could generate political pressure for 
wider tariff reductions. It was argued that the government should rely more on direct transfers, 
although it was recognized that developing a well-designed and well-implemented safety net would 
take some time. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple partial equilibrium model 
that provides a framework for integrating the distributional, efficiency, and revenue influences of both 
policies into an evaluation of the net welfare effect of the two policy alternatives. Section 3 uses this 
framework to evaluate each of the policies in turn and to compare across both. Section 4 discusses 
some caveats related to the use of a partial equilibrium model, identifying potential implications for 
our policy conclusions. Section 5 provides a brief summary of the results and their policy implications.   2
2.  A PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
In this section, we present a partial equilibrium model that provides a useful framework to guide our 
evaluation of the relative welfare effects of tariff reductions and transfers. Although the model has a 
clear general equilibrium counterpart, the assumptions we make transform it into a partial equilibrium 
model.
1 
2.1. The Model 
The model has two agents: households and the government. Rural agricultural households are 
incorporated into the household sector so that formally there is no need to distinguish between 
agricultural producers and nonproducers. All other producers in the economy are implicitly assumed to 
produce using constant returns to scale technology, with fixed producer and factor prices. 
Household welfare is captured by a standard indirect utility function V(p, y), where p is a 
vector of prices facing the household sector (factor prices are included as negative entries) and y is 
lump-sum income; later, superscript h will be added to denote specific households. Household lump-
sum income is given by 
  (, ) yA m π = + p  (1) 
where π(p, A) is a (restricted) profit function that gives the imputed rent obtained from land area A 
given p, and m is lump-sum transfers to or from the government. The profit function in turn is given 
by 
  () . A π , =⋅−⋅ pp q c f  (2) 
where q is a vector of agricultural output, c is a vector of input prices, and f is a vector of input 
quantities. 
The government derives revenue from both rice import tariffs and lump-sum taxation of 
households; so revenue R is given by 
  ()
h
ii i i i h R ts T t x m =+ = −− ∑ q  (3) 
where subscript i denotes rice,  ∑ =
h
h
i i x x is the aggregate household demand for rice, 
h
ii h q =∑ q is 
the aggregate household production of rice,  iii sx = −q  is the imports of rice calculated as the 
difference between aggregate consumption and production of rice in the economy, and 
h m is the lump-
sum transfer to each household (if positive) or lump-sum tax from each household (if negative) so that 
∑ − =
h
h m T is the net lump-sum taxes and transfers between the government and households. The 
import tax per unit of rice is denoted by 
*
i i i p p t − = , where the asterisk superscript denotes border 
import prices. We abstract from trade and transport margins for convenience. Note that, under this 
specification, a unit increase in the rice tariff leads to a unit increase in the domestic price. 
                                                 
1 See Drèze and Stern (1987) and Newbery and Stern (1987) for more detailed discussions of the general model and 
Coady and Drèze (2002) for the implications of alternative distributional assumptions for tax rules. See also Braverman, 
Hammer, and Ahn (1987) and Newbery (1987) for early empirical evaluations of agricultural price reforms for Korea and 
Coady (1997) for an application of the model within the context of an evaluation of agricultural pricing policies for Pakistan.   3
Social welfare in the economy is defined, over H households, by a standard Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare function: 
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hh HH WW V y V y V y =… …   pp p . (4) 
The effect on social welfare of a (marginal) reform of each policy instrument (i.e., tariff  i t  or 
transfers 
h m ) is derived by differentiating the social welfare function with respect to that instrument. 
Each of these reforms will also have revenue implications that need to be incorporated into the overall 
welfare analysis. To avoid having to explicitly identify the social cost of raising an extra unit of 
government revenue to finance the resulting expenditures, the approach taken here is to focus on 
equal-revenue expenditure reforms. Specifically, we identify the welfare effect of a tariff reduction 
that results in a unit decrease in government revenue and compare it to the welfare effect of allocating 
an extra unit of revenue to a transfer program that delivers transfers to households identified as poor. 
Under such revenue-neutral comparisons, the social cost of raising an extra unit of revenue to finance 
these unit expenditures can be assumed common across the alternative policy instruments and thus 
cancels out in any comparison across reforms.
2 
2.2. Rice Tariff Reform 
Differentiating the social welfare function (4) with respect to  i t  and applying Roy’s identity to the 
indirect utility function and Shepard’s lemma to the profit function (2) gives the effect on social 
welfare of a marginal change, dti, in the rice tariff as 
  ()
hh
hh h h h h h
ii i i i i i i i i hh hh hh h h
i
WW V W V
dt x dt dt x dt s dt
tV yV y
ββ
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=− + =− − =−
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∑∑ ∑ ∑ qq , 
where 
h β is the social valuation of an extra unit of income to household h, typically referred to as the 
welfare weight. The revenue effect of this reform is given by differentiating the revenue equation (3) 
with respect to  i t , which gives 
  () ( ) ( 1 )
xq s ii i i
ii ii i i i i i ii i i i ii
ii i i i
xq x R
dt t dt s dt s dt s dt s dt
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where  i τ is the tariff rate (i.e., the share of the tariff in the market price),  ,,
x qs
iii η ηη are the price 







are the ratios of aggregate demand and production to imports, respectively. The term 
s
i iη τ can 
be interpreted as the marginal deadweight loss associated with a unit increase in the tariff level: the 
effect on social welfare (ignoring equity concerns so that welfare weights are implicitly unity) is  i s − ; 
and the effect on revenue is  ) 1 (
s
i i i s η τ + , so the net effect on the economy is  0 <
s
i i i s η τ  because 
0 > i s ,  0 <
s
i η , and  0 > i τ . 
                                                 
2 Coady and Harris (2004) present more detailed discussion and examples of the calculation of the MCFs under 
alternative tax transfer schemes within a general equilibrium version of the model.   4
Dividing the social welfare effect by the revenue effect gives the social welfare cost of an 





















θβ =∑  is the share of the burden borne by household h and  R
s
i i η η τ = + ) 1 (  is the 
elasticity of revenue with respect to the tariff, so its inverse is the price (or tariff) increase required to 
increase revenue by one unit. If demand and production do not respond to prices, then  0 =
s
i η and the 
welfare effect arises solely from a redistributional effect. Every unit increase in revenue results in a 
unit decrease in aggregate household income, and the numerator captures how this burden is 
distributed across households. The greater the positive correlation between the burden share and 
household income (or, equivalently, between 
h β and 
h θ ), the higher the share of the burden borne by 
low-income households and, thus, the greater the decrease in social welfare. 
With  0 =
s
i η , the revenue elasticity is unity, implying that a 10 percent increase in the tax will 
result in a 10 percent increase in revenue. However, if  0 <
s
i η , then the revenue elasticity is less than 
unity and the tax needs to increase by more than 10 percent to raise an extra 10 percent in revenue. 
Therefore, the welfare effect of raising a unit of revenue is greater when  0 <
s
i η , that is, when the 
revenue base is elastic. This, of course, is the source of the marginal deadweight loss associated with 
tariff increases; by fixing the revenue requirement, we are simply returning this extra deadweight loss 
to households via higher tariffs. 
2.3. Targeted Transfers 
The social welfare impact of a transfer program is derived by differentiating the social welfare 
function with respect to lump-sum transfers from the government, that is, 
h m . A transfer program can 















h dm is the lump-sum transfer to the household and different transfer programs can be thought 
of as different vectors of such transfers to households. 
The revenue effect of the transfer program is made up of the sum of transfers plus an 

























is the amount of each extra unit of income to a household that is allocated to rice 
consumption, that is, the marginal budget share (MBS) of rice. If we assume that the MBS is constant 












.   5
The first term in brackets is the marginal tax propensity for rice, that is, the impact on rice tariff 
revenue of a unit income transfer to households.
3 If the tax rate is positive and rice is a normal good, 
then the marginal tax propensity is positive so that the full term in brackets is less than unity in 
absolute terms. This captures the fact that each unit of transfer to households generates tax revenues 
from higher rice consumption so that the net revenue cost of the unit transfer is less than unity.
4 
Dividing the social welfare effect by the revenue effect gives the social welfare benefit of a 




































social welfare impact of the transfer program then depends on how well it is targeted at low-income 
households with relatively high welfare weights—the greater the leakage of benefits to high-income 
households with relatively low welfare weights, the lower the redistributional power of the program 
and the lower the social welfare impact.
5 
In practice, a major concern often expressed regarding safety net programs is that too many 
program resources are absorbed by operating costs and thus never reach the intended beneficiaries.
6 
This feature of programs can be incorporated into the above model by making the revenue impact also 
depend on these costs, say, as a fixed proportion of the total program budget. It is then straightforward 













where ρ  is the share of transfers in total program costs. The inverse of the term ρ  can be interpreted 
as an efficiency cost of transfers, that is, the budget cost of transferring one unit of revenue to 
beneficiary households. 
2.4 Welfare Weights 
The calculation of  t λ  and  m λ  above requires one to specify a set of welfare weights, which capture 
the relative social valuation of a unit of income to each household. A very useful and common 
approach to specifying these weights derives from Atkinson’s (1970) constant elasticity of social 
welfare function where the welfare weight of household h is calculated as: 
  (/)
hk h y y
ε β ≡  
                                                 
3 See Coady and Drèze (2002) for a more detailed discussion of the role of the tax propensity in tax reform and 
optimum tax rules. 
4 Note that the assumption that the MBSs for rice are constant across households biases the welfare impact of transfers 
downward for progressive transfers because, in reality, one expects MBSs to be negatively correlated with income. 
5 See Coady and Skoufias (2004) for a more detailed discussion of this statistic. 
6 See Grosh (1994) and Caldés, Coady, and Maluccio (2006) for more detailed discussions on the operating costs of 
transfer programs.   6
where k is a reference household (for which  1
k β = ) and ε  captures one’s aversion to inequality, with 
this aversion increasing inε . For example, a value of  0 ε = implies no aversion to inequality (i.e., a 
franc is a franc no matter to whom it accrues) so that all welfare weights take on the value unity. A 
value of  1 ε =  implies that if household h has twice (half) the income of household k, then its welfare 
weight is 0.5 (2.0) as opposed to unity for k. A value of  2 ε =  similarly implies a welfare weight of 
0.25 (4.0) for h. 
As ε  approaches infinity, the welfare impact on the poorest household dominates the 
evaluation, consistent with a Rawlsian maxi-min social welfare perspective where one only cares 
about the welfare of the poorest household or welfare group. For example, if we divide households 
into welfare quintiles, assign each household the mean income of its quintile group, and set the welfare 
weight of the lowest quintile equal to unity, then as ε  approaches infinity the terms 
D hh
m h λ βφ ≡∑  
and 
D hh
t h λ βθ ≡∑  above converge to the share of the total change in household incomes that 
accrues to the poorest quintile. More generally, one can interpret these terms as the share of total 
benefits accruing to the target population as defined by the set of welfare weights. 
In our empirical analysis below, we evaluate the welfare impact of policy reforms for values 
1 ε =  to  5 ε = . Consistent with the literature, we use household per capita consumption as our 
measure of household welfare. Figure 1 presents nonparametric cumulative densities of welfare in 
urban and rural areas separately. The welfare weights used in our analysis are presented in Table 1 of 
the appendix. Note that if we classify the poorest 30 percent of households as poor, the welfare 
weights for  3 ε ≥  mimic very closely the pattern of welfare weights implicit in a severity of poverty 
index, with the welfare weights for households at or above the poverty line being near zero. 
Throughout the paper we use the terms extreme poor to refer to households in the bottom welfare 
decile, moderate poor to refer to households in deciles 2 and 3, poor to refer to households in the 
bottom three welfare deciles, middle income to refer to households in deciles 4–7, and high income to 
refer to households in the top 3 deciles. We also use the terms welfare and income interchangeably. In 
all figures using nonparametric regressions, we superimpose vertical lines indicating the 10th, 30th, 
70th, and 90th percentiles to facilitate interpretation of patterns across the welfare distribution. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001.   7
3.  THE WELFARE IMPACT OF TARIFFS AND TRANSFERS 
In this section, we evaluate, in turn, the welfare impact of distributing a unit of revenue to households 
using rice tariffs and targeted transfers. For each policy instrument, we look separately at the 
distributional and efficiency implications. We then combine both these dimensions to compare their 
net welfare impact. For the purposes of analyzing the distributional dimensions, we use data available 
in the 2001 national household survey (Enquête permanente auprès des ménages, EPM2001). A brief 
description of these data is presented in the appendix. 
3.1. Lowering Rice Tariffs 
A tariff on rice imports increases the domestic price of rice above world prices and is essentially a 
subsidy to rice net producers financed by a tax on rice net consumers. The effect on government is 
similar to that of a net supplier to the market, with imported rice being sold at a higher domestic price 
and the government claiming the difference between domestic and world prices as revenue. In the 
absence of any demand and supply responses, the government share of the benefit will equal the share 
of imports in total consumption—the rest goes to net producers. Decreasing the tariff therefore results 
in a decrease in the domestic price, a redistribution of income from net producers to net consumers, 
and a decrease in revenue. At the start of 2004, the net tax on rice imports was 45 percent, so that, 
ignoring trade and transport margins, the domestic price faced by producers and consumers was 1.45 
times the world price. This net tax reflected a combination of two separate taxes: an import tariff of 20 
percent and a VAT of 21 percent, with the latter levied on the import tax-inclusive price. 
Figure 2 presents times series on international and domestic rice prices as well as import 
volumes. Private sector rice imports, which averaged 170,000 tons per year between 2000 and 2004 
(equivalent to about 10 percent of net supply), follow a distinct seasonal pattern, typically peaking 6–
11 months after the main harvest (i.e., from October to March). Domestic prices of locally produced 
and imported rice in the capital, Antananarivo, track each other very closely, reflecting the fact that 
these are very close substitutes.
7 However, there has been a substantial gap between the cost, 
insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) import price and the domestic prices of imported rice because of 
substantial VATs and import tariffs (in addition to domestic marketing margins), which increase from 
mid-1999 as the c.i.f. price falls. The sharp rise in the domestic prices of local and imported rice that 
began at the end of 2003 mirrors the rise in c.i.f. rice prices. The price of local rice rose substantially 
above the (official) price of imported rice at the end of 2004, however, because policy uncertainty 
resulted in a shortfall of total (public and private) rice imports (Minten and Dorosh, 2006). 
                                                 
7 Moser, Barrett, and Minten (2006) show that rice markets in 2000 were fairly well integrated at the subregional level 
although high transfer costs and lack of competition limited integration at the national level. Thus, changes in the costs of 
imported rice are not necessarily directly transmitted to markets throughout rural Madagascar.   8

















































Source: Minten and Dorosh (2006). 
 
Rice Consumption and Production Patterns 
Based on EPM2001, approximately 76 percent of households are classified as rural. Rural households 
are disproportionately represented among the poor with, for example, around 90 percent of poor 
households being rural. As expected, the direction of rice trade differs markedly between urban and 
rural areas. Whereas in urban areas 87 percent of households are net purchasers of rice, in rural areas 
66 percent are net purchasers. 
Patterns of trade also vary substantially across welfare groups within both urban and rural 
areas. Figures 3a and 3b present the classification of urban and rural households according to whether 
they are net sellers or net buyers or neither (i.e., rice subsistence households). In urban areas, whereas 
around 65 percent of poor households are net purchasers of rice, over 90 percent of high-income 
households are net purchasers. Similarly, in rural areas, whereas around 64 percent of poor households 
are net purchasers, around 70 percent of high-income households are net purchasers. 
Of course, the welfare impact of a change in the price of rice will depend not only on the 
direction of rice trade but also on the magnitude of the rice flows involved. For the purposes of 
capturing the diversity of flows, households are classified according to whether they are urban or rural, 
are small or big rice cultivators (using 0.25 hectare of rice land as the cutoff), own land but do not 
cultivate rice, or are landless. Figures 4a and 4b present the magnitude of rice flows for each of these   9
household classifications and across welfare groups.
8 In urban areas, only big rice cultivators, 
constituting around 3.6 percent of all households, are net sellers of rice across all deciles. All other 
urban groups are net purchasers across all deciles, with the higher welfare groups tending to have 
substantially larger net purchases. In rural areas, again only big rice cultivators, constituting around 35 
percent of the total population, are net sellers, with net sales being substantially higher for the highest 
welfare groups. All other household groups are net purchasers of rice, with magnitudes increasing with 
welfare levels. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Nonparametric analysis of data from a 1990 survey of rice farmers by Barrett and Dorosh (1996) showed similar 
patterns of net rice sales by landholdings and by income.   10
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
The percentage welfare (or real income) impact of a unit decrease in the price of rice (i.e., a 
price decrease of one FMG per kilogram of rice) on each household can be calculated by dividing the 
quantity (in kilograms) of each household’s market purchases or sales by total household income, that 
is,  / i sy  for each household. Figures 5a and 5b present such a welfare impact for a 33 percent 
decrease in price, which at 2005 prices of about 1,500 FMG per kilogram is equivalent to a 500 FMG 
price decrease. The welfare impact of a price decrease of this magnitude is clearly sizeable. In urban 
areas, the welfare impact is equivalent to an increase in welfare of between 4 and 6 percent for most 
net rice purchasers, although this falls to between2 and 4 percent for high-income households.
9 For net 
sellers (i.e., big rice producers), the impact is a decrease in welfare of greater than 2 percent for 
moderately poor and middle-income households, but this falls toward zero for both extreme poor and 
high welfare households. For rural households, the impact on net purchasers is clearly progressive, 
with welfare increases between 2.5 and 7 percent for poor households but falling to less than 3 percent 
for high-income households. For net sellers, the decrease in welfare is also progressive, with poor 
households experiencing decreases of between 1 and 3 percent and high-income households 
experiencing decreases of between 5 and 15 percent. 
                                                 
9 The bottom 10 percent of households have a monthly per capita consumption of less than 25,000 FMG, the bottom 30 
percent have a consumption of less than around 40,000 FMG, and the top 30 percent have a consumption of greater than 
135,000 FMG.   12
Figure 5a. Welfare impact of rice price decrease, urban 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
 
 
Figure 5b. Welfare impact of rice price decrease, rural 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
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Distributional Impact 






θ =  and 
household welfare. Table 1 presents the sum of 
h θ for each welfare decile and also for each household 
classification. This shows how the benefit from each unit of revenue lost due to a price (and tariff) 
decrease is distributed across households. The first column shows the distribution of welfare changes 
across each welfare decile. The top five deciles all gain from the price decrease. Out of every 100 
FMG lost from tariff revenue, these households together gain 97.8 FMG. The gains from tariff 
reduction are thus very badly targeted. 
But the aggregate gains and losses across deciles hide substantial variation across households 
within deciles and across household classifications. Whereas landless households in both urban and 
rural areas together gain 128 FMG, big rice cultivators lose 81 FMG. Nonrice farmers and small rice 
cultivators also gain 53 FMG. For both gainers and losers, the aggregate impacts on the lower welfare 
deciles are substantially smaller than those on the higher deciles. Therefore, lower rice tariffs 
essentially involve a redistribution of welfare from higher income net producers to higher income net 
consumers with little absolute impact on lower income groups, reflecting the low absolute rice trading 
levels of the latter.   14
Table 1. Distribution of welfare impact from tariff increase across households (shares) 
   Urban  Households  Rural  Households 
  All 
Households 












Bottom 0.018  0.000  −0.000  0.001 0.001  0.008 −0.028  0.025 0.010 
2nd decile  −0.002  0.004  −0.005  0.001 0.002  0.006 −0.060  0.039 0.012 
3rd decile  0.029  0.007  −0.001  0.005 0.001  0.017 −0.049  0.029 0.020 
4th decile  0.001  0.022  −0.004  0.002 0.003  0.015 −0.100  0.045 0.018 
5th decile  −0.024  0.039  −0.003  0.003 0.005  0.027 −0.156  0.032 0.029 
6th decile  0.119  0.061  −0.009  0.007 0.008  0.061 −0.068  0.024 0.036 
7th decile  0.116  0.081  −0.000  0.005 0.004  0.086 −0.085  0.002 0.024 
8th decile  0.228  0.162  −0.004  0.002 0.008  0.082 −0.065  0.030 0.012 
9th decile  0.301  0.175  −0.003  0.007 0.009  0.090 −0.016  0.010 0.030 
Top 0.214  0.197  −0.002  0.003 0.003  0.137 −0.148  0.018 0.007 
                  
Total 1.000  0.748  −0.031  0.036 0.044  0.529 −0.775  0.254 0.198 
Share of Total 
Households  1.000 0.165  0.036  0.024 0.012  0.141  0.350  0.186 0.086 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
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Efficiency Impact 
As well as having a redistributional effect, tariffs have an efficiency effect, which must be 
incorporated into any analysis. The marginal social cost of raising one unit of revenue by increasing 
tariffs (or marginal cost of funds, MCF) is calculated as the inverse of the revenue elasticity; see (5). 
For example, if production is 80 percent of total consumption (imports accounting for the remaining 
20 percent), the elasticity of production is 0.2, and the elasticity of consumption is −0.3, then the 
elasticity of imports is approximately −2.3. This very high elasticity reflects the fact that even small 
responses in consumption and production translate into very large proportional changes in imports, 
because imports are only a small share of consumption. The tax base is thus extremely elastic. Because 
the initial tax rate (defined, somewhat differently than earlier, as the share of tax in the domestic price) 
is 30 percent, the MCF is 3.23 (the inverse of 1 + 0.3 * −2.3). The deadweight loss associated with an 
increase in the tariff that raises this one unit of revenue is thus 2.23. The converse of this is that a 
reduction in the tariff generates an equally large efficiency gain. The marginal efficiency gain from 
decreasing tariffs can also be expected to decrease as the tariff approaches zero because imports (the 
tax base) will increase as a proportion of total supply when production falls and consumption 
increases, and the elasticity of imports will also decrease. 
Table 2 presents the MCFs for alternative assumptions about the demand and supply 
elasticities, as well as about the share of imports in total supply. Notice that the MCF is negative for 
higher elasticities of production and consumption when the import share is 10 percent. This indicates 
that the tariff is on the wrong side of the Laffer curve; so a decrease in the tariff is associated with an 
increase in revenue, reflecting a substantial increase in imports. Therefore, in an aggregate sense, a 
potential Pareto improvement exists because decreasing the tariff will increase both revenue and the 
aggregate welfare of households as the latter are, in aggregate, net purchasers. Ignoring such Pareto-
improving possibilities, the range for the MCF is 1.20–6.25. When combining the, distributional and 
efficiency impacts below, we therefore consider MCF values of 1.20 (low), 3.70 (medium), and 6.25 
(high). 
Distribution and Efficiency 
We now combine the distributional and efficiency implications of tariff decreases using equation (5). 
Table 3 presents the marginal social benefit from a tariff decrease under alternative assumptions for 
both the MCF and the level of inequality aversion. The first column presents the pure distributional 
impact, 
D
t λ , for alternative levels of inequality aversion, which can be interpreted as the increase in 
welfare of our target population as defined by the underlying welfare weights. This suggests that the 
benefits from a tariff reduction are not well targeted because 
D
t λ  decreases rapidly with ε . Only 
0.019 units of each revenue unit forgone accrue to the lowest parts of the welfare distribution. 
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Table 2. Marginal cost of public funds for different import elasticities 













xq ηη =− =  2.33  ( 1.90
s η =− ) 1.37  ( 0.90
s η =− ) 1.20  ( 0.57
s η =− ) 
0.1; 0.2
xq ηη =− =  6.25  ( 2.80
s η =− ) 1.64  ( 1.30
s η =− ) 1.32  ( 0.80
s η =− ) 
0.2; 0.1
xq ηη =− =   −7.14 ( 3.80
s η =− ) 2.17  ( 1.80
s η =− ) 1.51  ( 1.13
s η =− ) 
0.3; 0.2
xq ηη =− =   −2.27 ( 4.80
s η =− ) 3.23  ( 2.30
s η =− ) 1.78  ( 1.47
s η =− ) 
0.3; 0.3
xq ηη =− =   −1.41 ( 5.70
s η =− ) 5.26  ( 2.70
s η =− ) 2.04  ( 1.70
s η =− ) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
 
Table 3. Welfare impact of lower rice tariff 
   D
t λ   tL λ   tM λ   tH λ  
Inequality 
Aversion 
     
0 ε =   1.000 1.200 3.700  6.250 
1 ε =   0.172 0.207 0.637  1.077 
2 ε =   0.050 0.059 0.183  0.310 
5 ε =   0.019 0.023 0.071  0.191 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
The final three columns adjust for the efficiency gains from tariff reductions. The first row 
shows the aggregate welfare benefits for all households for alternative MCFs: the aggregate benefit to 
households from each unit of revenue forgone from tariff reductions ranges from 1.20 to 6.25 for low- 
to high-efficiency gains. For each value of MCF, the column gives the product of the MCF and 
D
t λ . 
Looking across the final row, the benefit to the poorest households from a unit of revenue forgone 
from a tariff reduction ranges from 0.023 to 0.191. 
3.2. Targeted Transfers 
The effectiveness of targeted transfers as a poverty alleviation instrument will depend on how 
effective the program is at both identifying poor households and ensuring that transfers are delivered 
to them at low administrative cost. In practice, even the best targeted transfer programs are imperfectly 
targeted, with some of the transfers leaking to the nonpoor and incomplete coverage of the poor. In 
addition, designing and implementing a transfer program requires that some budget resources be 
devoted to these activities, reducing the amount of the budget available for transfers to program 
beneficiaries. Of course, these two dimensions are interdependent—the more resources allocated to 
improving the design and implementation of a program, the higher the percentage of the transfer 
budget that will reach poor households. 
Existing empirical evidence shows that the performance of transfer programs varies 
substantially in both dimensions across and within countries and across targeting methods used and 
program types. A recent review of the targeting performance of transfer programs found that under the   17
median program, the poor received only 25 percent more than their population share (Coady, Grosh, 
and Hoddinott, 2004). If 30 percent of the population is classified as poor, this implies that only 37.5 
percent of transfers go to the poor. However, many programs do substantially better than the median. 
For example, the median targeting performance for programs using some form of means testing was 
such that the poor received a share of transfers that was 1.5 times their population share. Using a 30 
percent poverty rate, this implies the poor receive 45 percent of total transfers. Even within means-
tested programs, there was substantial variation in performance. The median performance for the top 
10 performing programs was such that the poor received approximately twice their population share of 
transfers, that is, the poorest 30 percent would receive 60 percent of transfers. 
High administrative costs further decrease the effectiveness of transfer programs (conditional 
on targeting performance). Unfortunately, there is very little evidence on the cost level or structure of 
transfer programs. But what little evidence exists suggests that there may be great variability, with the 
share of administrative costs in the total program budget ranging from 10 percent to 40 percent 
(Caldés, Coady, and Maluccio, 2006; Grosh, 1994). In other words, the fiscal cost of distributing one 
unit of welfare to all beneficiary households ranges from 1.11 to 1.67 units. 
To address the issue of the potential effectiveness of targeted transfers in the context of 
Madagascar, we use information from ECM2001 on the socioeconomic characteristics of households 
to simulate the targeting performance of a program that employs proxy-means targeting. We start by 
identifying a range of household characteristics that are typically highly correlated with household 
welfare.
10 Household welfare is then regressed on these characteristics. The estimated coefficients are 
taken as weights that are applied to household characteristics to get a household score, in this case 
predicted household consumption per capita. Households with a score below a certain threshold are 
identified as program beneficiaries. 
Basing program eligibility on the predicted score will of course result in the standard targeting 
errors. For example, if the poorest 30 percent of households according to the score are deemed poor 
and thus eligible for program benefits, then some households that would be classified as poor based on 
per capita consumption will be wrongly excluded (errors of mission) and some nonpoor households 
will be wrongly included (errors of inclusion). Figure 5 presents the distribution of targeting errors for 
the simulated transfer program.
11 
                                                 
10 In practice, these characteristics should be easily verified by program officials and not easily manipulated by 
households in an attempt to gain access to the program. Typically, households will be informed about the existence of such a 
program and asked to apply at a program office, thus introducing an element of self-selection into the targeting process. At 
the office, households report these characteristics and are informed if they are potentially eligible. Eligible households will 
then be visited to verify the reported information. 
11 The underlying regression used per capita household consumption as the dependent variable. Independent variables 
included information on geographic location; gender, age, education, and sectoral employment of the head of household; 
household size and composition; types of housing and materials for walls, floors, and ceilings; housing area; source of water 
and lighting; and possession of various consumer durables. The r-squared for the regression was 0.69 based on 4,857 
household observations. More details are available from the authors upon request.   18
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
The vertical line in Figure 6 is the poverty line, so the curves to the left of it indicate 
undercoverage of the poor (U) and those to the right of it indicate leakage to nonpoor (L) households. 
Undercoverage and leakage are highest close to the poverty line, undercoverage is highest in urban 
areas, and leakage is highest in rural areas. So, on average, the rural nonpoor are included at the 
expense of the urban poor. This, of course, could be partly addressed by developing a different proxy-
means scoring system for urban and rural areas and allocating program places across urban and rural 
areas in proportion to those areas’ share of the poor population. 
Table 4 presents the welfare impact of transfers based on equation (6). The first column 
presents the share of transfers accruing to the various target populations as specified by the underlying 
welfare weights. Nearly 30 percent of transfers accrue to the poorest households: Every one unit of 
revenue transferred through the program results in 0.3 going to the bottom decile of the welfare 
distribution. The first column essentially abstracts from administrative costs (an efficiency cost) as 
well as the efficiency benefit associated with the extra rice tariff revenue due to higher rice 
consumption; these welfare impacts are captured in the final three columns. The first row of these 
columns gives the share of the budget allocated to transfers (i.e., one minus the share of administrative 
costs in the budget), reflecting the administrative efficiency of the program times an adjustment for 
second-round revenue benefits. This share of the budget allocated to transfers is taken to range from 
0.6 for the low-efficiency program (L), to 0.75 for medium-efficiency programs (M), to 0.9 for the 
high-efficiency program (H). These are multiplied by 1.057 to capture second-round revenue effects, 
derived using 0.18 as the MBS for rice, which in turn is based on available empirical estimates.
12 
Incorporating these into the analysis, the final row shows that the benefit accruing to the lowest 
welfare households from every one unit of revenue allocated to the program ranges from 0.19 to 0.28. 
 
 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of rice demand patterns in Madagascar, see Lundberg and Rich (2002); Minten, Randrianarisoa, and 
Zeller (1998); Ravelosoa, Haggblade, and Rejemison (1999); and Stifel and Randrianarisoa (2004).   19
Table 4. Welfare impact of proxy-means-targeted transfers 
D
m λ   mL λ   mM λ   mH λ  
     
0 ε =   1.000 0.634  0.793 0.951 
1 ε =   0.608 0.386  0.482 0.579 
2 ε =   0.442 0.280  0.350 0.420 
5 ε =   0.297 0.189  0.236 0.283 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
 
3.3. Tariffs, Transfers, or Both? 
In this section, we compare the net social welfare impact of tariffs and transfers by comparing the 
welfare impact per unit of revenue absorbed by each policy instrument. As above, for each instrument 
we consider three scenarios representing high (H), medium (M), and low (L) efficiency levels. With 
tariffs, these relate to different assumptions about demand and supply responses, which affect the 
revenue elasticity and thus the magnitude of the efficiency gain from reducing tariffs. We consider 
revenue elasticities of 6.25 (tHigh), 3.70 (tMedium), and 1.20 (tLow). With direct transfers, the 
scenarios relate to the administrative effectiveness in terms of the share of the program budget 
absorbed by administrative costs: We consider administrative cost shares of 10 percent (mHigh), 25 
percent (mMedium), and 40 percent (mLow). 
Figure 7 presents the high- and low-efficiency welfare impacts for each policy instrument for 
15 ε ≥≤. If the efficiency gains from reducing rice tariffs are on the lower side, then tariff reduction 
is dominated by even the low-efficiency direct transfer programs. Tariff reductions are only superior if 
the efficiency gains are on the higher side and at lower values of ε , where sufficient weight is given 
to welfare gains accruing to higher income groups. With high-efficiency gains, tariff reductions clearly 
dominate at  1 ε = , where the weight given to welfare gains to higher income households is relatively 
large. At higher values of ε , the attraction of tariffs as a poverty alleviation mechanism diminishes 
rapidly, reflecting the almost exclusive focus on gains at the bottom of the welfare distribution. 
Therefore, a focus on poor households (e.g., taking  2 ε > ) would clearly rank direct targeted transfers 
above tariff reductions as a poverty alleviation measure. Reasonably effective transfer programs are 
clearly a more cost-effective approach to poverty alleviation. This is reinforced when one takes into 
account that the efficiency gains from tariff reductions are upper bounds, because they refer to 
marginal changes and thus can be expected to decrease nonlinearly with the tariff rate. 
It is tempting to interpret the above results as an argument for increasing the rice tariff to 
finance transfers to the poor. The welfare increase from such a reform package can be calculated as 
() mt λ λ − , which is clearly positive for higher levels of aversion to inequality. However, this ignores 
the fact that the MCF associated with raising revenue using other tax instruments is probably much 
lower. In this case, it is clearly preferable to switch from rice tariffs to other taxes and to use any 
revenue increases to finance a transfer program. In addition, initial tariff reductions will also have a 
substantial impact on poverty reduction because the efficiency gains are likely to be substantially 
higher when tariffs are reduced from a high level.   20









































Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPM2001. 
The results can also be interpreted as an argument for sequencing policy reforms by initially 
reducing tariffs, gradually replacing them with other tax revenues (possibly as part of a broader tax 
reform that improves the efficiency of the tax system), and using some of the extra revenues to 
develop an effectively targeted transfer program. However, to the extent that it takes time to develop a 
comprehensive and cost-effective safety net, some ad hoc measures aimed at mitigating the adverse 
impacts on poor net sellers of rice are warranted. Such measures could take many forms, including 
measures aimed at increasing land productivity through increasing yields and diversifying into 
alternative crops. These targeted measures should eventually be integrated into the overall safety net 
framework.   21
4.  FROM PARTIAL TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
An obvious shortcoming of the above discussion is that it is partial equilibrium. A general equilibrium 
approach that addresses both the indirect revenue effects through changing demand and supply for 
other taxed or subsidized goods and services, as well as the welfare effects generated through factor 
markets, might change some of the numbers above or even the qualitative nature of the results. For 
example, in principle, if goods that are very strong substitutes or complements to rice in production or 
consumption are relatively highly taxed or subsidized, then indirect revenue effects may be 
substantial. However, in practice, because the other main crops grown in Madagascar (maize and 
cassava) are not traded internationally and not subject to taxes or subsidies, these indirect revenue 
effects are not likely to be important. 
Alternatively, if rice production is relatively unskilled labor intensive, then lower rice prices 
may result in lower unskilled wages. If the poorest households rely very heavily on such sources of 
income and if they cannot find alternative employment—for example, in the production of other 
crops—then, in principle, this wage effect may be strong enough to switch these households from 
being net gainers to net losers. Note that this unskilled wage effect would simply make tariff 
reductions even less attractive from a distributional perspective and reinforce the dominance of 
transfers from a poverty alleviation perspective. In this instance, it is still the case that a reform 
package of lower tariffs combined with increases in other taxes and direct interventions through safety 
nets is the most effective policy response, because the tax reform should generate substantial 
efficiency gains that can then be used to finance a transfer program that benefits the poorest 
households. 
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5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is concerned with the relative efficiency, distributional, and revenue implications of tariffs 
and transfers, especially in the context of identifying their respective roles for poverty alleviation. The 
results indicate that although there are likely to be substantial efficiency gains from tariff reductions, 
these accrue mainly to higher income households. In addition, poor net rice sellers lose from price 
decreases. Developing a system of well-designed and well-implemented targeted direct transfers to 
poor households is thus likely to be a substantially more cost-effective approach to poverty alleviation. 
Such an approach can be financed by switching the source of revenue from rice tariffs to alternative, 
more efficient tax instruments. In the short term, the development of a system of direct transfers could 
focus on poor net rice sellers (i.e., smallholder rice producers) because these households lose from 
tariff reductions; these transfers could also be conditioned on participation in extension services to 
promote higher agricultural productivity. Over the longer term, such a program should be integrated 
into a more comprehensive targeted safety net mechanism that has high coverage of poor households.   23
APPENDIX  THE MADAGASCAR EPM HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
The analysis in the paper uses information from the 2001 Madagascar household survey, Enquête 
permanente auprès des ménages (EPM2001), organized by the National Statistical Institute (INSTAT) 
at the end of 2001. The survey was nationwide and comprehensive and included information on 
household socioeconomic characteristics, consumption, health, education, income sources, time 
allocation, occupation, and agricultural production. The sample was set up in a stratified manner to 
produce representative statistics at the national and provincial level as well as along the urban-rural 
divide. The total sample consists of 5,080 households. About 2,500 households have land in 
cultivation. Households in rural areas accounted for 2,040 household in the sample. 
The consumption aggregate was calculated for the year prior to the survey and incorporates 
food autoconsumption (from agricultural production, livestock production, and enterprise income), 
purchased food, food gifts and payments in-kind, education and health-care expenditures, imputed and 
actual housing costs, expenditures on consumer durables, and other nonfood expenses. The 
consumption aggregate is deflated to account for regional price differences using price information 
available in the survey and the Paasche index method. 
The definition of poverty used by INSTAT is based on these consumption data. A poor 
person, as identified by INSTAT, is a person who cannot afford to consume the bundle of food and 
nonfood goods deemed essential to lead an active and social life. The poverty line was evaluated in 
2001 at approximately 988.6 FMG per person per year (corresponding to US$0.42 per day). With this 
benchmark, it was estimated that almost 70 percent of the Malagasy population was poor. The poverty 
rate in rural areas was estimated at 77 percent and in urban areas at 44 percent. 
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